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DECISIONS AND INDECISIONS
Political and Intellectual Receptions of Carl Schmitt
In 1989 jürgen habermas opined that Carl Schmitt was unlikely to have the same ‘power of contagion in the Anglo-Saxon world’ as had Nietzsche and Heidegger.1 Too deep and unbridgeable was the spiritual gulf that separated the disgraced éminence grise of the 
ascending Axis power—publicly, at least, a virtual taboo figure within the 
Federal Republic—from the more liberal climes and political sensibili-
ties of the Anglosphere. Two decades later, such predictions may appear 
naive. In fact, the trend has been reversed. While the Schmitt reception 
in German public discourse and in academia—though growing and ever 
more strident—seems to remain residually tied to certain ethical inhi-
bitions that prevent a full and unqualified embrace of Göring’s former 
protégé, the Anglo-American Schmitt literature, beyond some notable 
critical engagements, has generated a less restricted rehabilitation. It 
either parades an authoritarian and part-time fascist thinker as a precur-
sor and ally of the neo-conservative revolution, re-mobilizing Schmitt’s 
notion of the state of emergency and his concept of the political; or it 
reads him as a radical—even critical—voice against a world-historical 
conjuncture characterized by liberal imperialism that flattens all geo-
political enmities and differences.2 This dual reception has outflanked 
the Kantian liberal-cosmopolitan mainstream in a pincer movement.
This ongoing Schmitt revival has been punctuated by two world-historical 
caesurae: the first was Helmut Kohl’s conservative ‘spiritual-moral 
turn’ plus German reunification; the second, the politics of the post-
9.11 Bush presidency. Whereas the first wave of Schmittiana in the 
1980s and 1990s was largely restricted to an exploration of his cri-
tique of liberalism and parlia mentary democracy—and thus confined 
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to domestic political theory and legal studies—this second revival has 
extended Schmitt’s intellectual reach over the fields of international 
relations, political philosophy and international legal theory.3 Here as 
there, Schmitt has been largely de-contextualized and dissociated from 
his commitment to and complicity with Nazism. Translations, though 
highly selective, of Schmitt’s voluminous work—most notably the 2003 
English edition of Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Ius Publicum—
have kept pace.4
Schmitt’s double attraction, as a modern classic on the executive state and 
significant figure against liberal universalism, has prompted a conver-
gence of positions—perhaps in a surprising complexio oppositorum—across 
1 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Horrors of Autonomy: Carl Schmitt in English’, in 
Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticisms and the Historians’ Debate, 
Cambridge 1989, p. 135.
2 For reception in Germany, see Thomas Darnstädt, ‘Der Mann der Stunde: Die 
Unheimliche Wiederkehr Carl Schmitts’, Der Spiegel, 39, 2008, pp. 160–1. For 
leading statements of the critical current, see Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of 
Antiliberalism, Cambridge, ma. 1993; William Scheuermann, Carl Schmitt: The End 
of Law, Lanham, md 1999; Mark Lilla, The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics, 
New York 2001; Jan-Werner Müller, A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War 
European Thought, New Haven 2003. For less restricted rehabilitations, see Chantal 
Mouffe, On the Political, London 2005; Slavoj Žižek, ‘Carl Schmitt in the Age of 
Post-Politics’, and other contributions in Mouffe, ed., The Challenge of Carl Schmitt, 
London 1999; Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, Cambridge, ma 2000; 
Danilo Zolo, Invoking Humanity, London 2002; William Rasch, Sovereignty and its 
Discontents, London 2004; Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, Chicago 2005; 
Peter Stirk, Carl Schmitt, Crown Jurist of the Third Reich, Lampeter 2005; Kam 
Shapiro, Carl Schmitt and the Intensification of Politics, Lanham, md 2008.
3 For statements in the International Relations literature, see Louiza Odysseos and 
Fabio Petito, eds, The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal 
War and the Crisis of Global Order, London 2007; William Hooker, Carl Schmitt’s 
International Thought: Order and Orientation, Cambridge 2009; Gabriella Slomp, 
Carl Schmitt and the Politics of Hostility, Violence and Terror, London 2009.
4 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the Ius Publicum Europaeum, New York 
2003. Key texts of Schmitt’s Nazi period—notably his 1939 Völkerrechtliche 
Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für Raumfremde Mächte [The Order of 
Greater Spaces in International Law and the Prohibition of Intervention for Space-
Alien Powers] and the series of justificatory articles around the 1933 Enabling Laws 
and the 1934 assassination of sa leaders, like Schmitt’s notorious ‘Das Gesetz zur 
Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich’ and ‘Der Führer schützt das Recht’, either 
remain untranslated or were published by obscure publishing houses. Cf. Carl 
Schmitt, Four Articles, 1931–1938, edited by Simona Draghici, Corvallis, or 1999.
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the non-liberal political spectrum; if not a convergence of their respective 
evaluative premises. His critical register presents a common reference 
point for a shared rejection of an apparently post-political neo-liberal 
order, expressed in the discourse of globalization, which was abruptly re-
politicized after 9.11 in a neo-authoritarian direction, now in the discourse 
of imperialism and empire. This state of affairs seemed to prove Schmitt 
doubly right: his trend-line diagnostics of the 20th century as the ‘age of 
neutralizations and de-politicizations’ could now be conjoined to a near-
permanent state of exception—even the exception as the rule—in the 
conceptualization of the contemporary world-political moment.5 The new 
constellation comprised a hyper-politicized neo-conservative us adminis-
tration acting outside the conventional remit of international law, while 
neutralizing its junior partners across the capitalist zone and externalizing 
international political opposition from the field of legitimate geopolitics 
altogether—terrorists, pirates and ‘rogue states’. At the horizon of this 
apocalyptic vision, sketched by Schmitt, looms a world without a political 
exterior: Pax Americana. In this context, the Schmittian vocabulary—
concept of the political, friend–enemy, state of exception, decisionism, 
executive government, nomos, pan-regions, pan-interventionism and 
non-discriminatory concept of war—presents not only an important 
rediscovery and addition to the mainstream international-relations lexi-
con, but has become a significant idiom for the social sciences at large, 
presenting a powerful counter-narrative to conventional imperialist liber-
alism.6 Carl Schmitt—and no end!
1. schmittian law and order
What is the secret behind Carl Schmitt’s contemporaneity and actuality? 
The argument relies on a broad endorsement of Schmitt’s interpretation 
of the age of the ius publicum—the body of maxims and praxes of early 
modern international law that prevailed, roughly, throughout the period 
from 1492/1648 to World War One—as a functioning system of legal 
norms, regulating the excesses of inter-state anarchy in a geopolitical 
5 Schmitt, ‘The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations’ [1929], Telos 96,  1993, 
p. 96.
6 Even Habermas now conceives the question of world order as a struggle between 
the Kantian and Schmittian projects. Habermas, The Divided West, Cambridge 
2006, pp. 188–193. The liberal-cosmopolitan mainstream is critically surveyed in 
Peter Gowan, ‘Neoliberal Cosmopolitanism’, nlr 11, Sept–Oct 2001, pp. 79–93.
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pluriverse without erasing the essence of sovereign statehood: the public 
and sovereign decision to conduct war. This unity of space and law—
termed by Schmitt a nomos, in contradistinction to the mediaeval and 
liberal-capitalist cosmos—revolved around five core categories: the state, 
as the only legitimate subject of war and peace; secularized and absolute 
state sovereignty; the executive, as the final arbiter over the state of excep-
tion; the idea of iustus hostis, the just enemy; and the associated concept 
of ‘non-discriminatory war’. According to Schmitt, the monopolization of 
warfare by states—ius belli ac pacis: the law of war and peace—removed 
violent conflict from the ideological struggles of ‘civil society’ and re-
concentrated organized violence at the level of the state. This arrogation 
of the monopoly of violence by absolutist states formalized a double 
distinction: firstly, that between public and private, de-legitimizing and 
de-militarizing private actors (lords, cities, estates, pirates, military 
orders) while elevating the public state as the only subject of international 
law and politics; and secondly, between inside and outside, separating a 
domestically neutralized and pacified ‘civil society’ from an international 
sphere of inter-state war and peace. This dualism fortified the distinction 
between public international law and private criminal law.
While war remained an indispensable and irreducible manifestation of 
concrete political communities—indeed: the essence of ‘the political’—
it was the crowning achievement of early-modern public law to have 
channelled generalized collective violence—an ongoing European civil 
war—into a ‘war in form’, conducted exclusively among legally rec-
ognized states according to certain rules and conventions. This move 
entailed, according to Schmitt, a clear distinction between belligerents 
and neutrals, combatants and non-combatants, states of war and states of 
peace. Schmitt referred to these achievements as the ‘bracketing of war’, 
which he lauded as the civilization, rationalization and humanization 
of war. Modern inter-state warfare came to be conducted among equals, 
according to certain inter-subjectively agreed and commonly binding 
legal conventions—a combination of the right to war, ius ad bellum, and 
rights in war, ius in bello—which also implied the positive making of 
peace. The ius ad bellum came to be divorced from ‘just cause’ considera-
tions (iusta causa), which were declared immaterial for determining the 
legitimacy of war. This gave rise to the notion of a ‘non-discriminatory 
concept of war’, which superseded mediaeval just-war doctrines. Thus 
juridically externalized, the reasons for war-declaration were placed 
outside any legal, moral or political judgement, implying the retention 
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of the status of the enemy, even during the fighting, as a just enemy, 
rather than a foe, criminal or barbarian. Morality, in that sense, came to 
be divorced from politics proper. A destructive moral universalism, as 
expressed in the 15th- and 16th-century wars of religion, was replaced by 
a salutary moral relativism in inter-state relations. Accordingly, the ius 
publicum implied a decisive rupture with mediaeval just-war theories, 
grounded in the moral universalism of the respublica christiana.
This new concept of war—as at once public (that is, restricted to inter-
state war), bracketed (that is, circumscribed by rational rules of conduct) 
and non-discriminatory (that is, morally neutral)—contrasted sharply 
with the anterior mediaeval practice of violence. Within feudal-Christian 
Europe, the arms-bearing status of the nobility and, in particular, the 
instrument of the ‘feud’, rendered all distinctions between the private 
and the public, as well as between the domestic and the international, 
futile. Outside feudal-Christian Europe the enemy was categorically ren-
dered as a barbarian, which included, by definition, the threat of his 
annihilation, exemplified in the Crusades. This shift from the mediaeval 
ius gentium, or law of the peoples, to the ius inter gentes, law between 
peoples, established a historically unprecedented and exemplary nomos, 
capable of combining untrammelled state sovereignty with the anarchy-
mitigating effects of international law.
Versailles and after
This line of reasoning was powerfully invoked by Schmitt against the 
post-World War One criminalization of the German Reich as an ‘outlaw 
nation’, whose political status as a sovereign state was revoked by the 
Versailles Diktat. As Germany was not admitted to the peace negotiations, 
and as ‘war guilt’ and ‘war crime’ were not juridical concepts in inter-state 
relations (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege), their formulation and intru-
sion into international law after 1919 transformed public inter-state law 
into an incipient world domestic law, starting to domesticate, re-moralize 
and juridify the inter-political by introducing a new ‘discriminatory con-
cept of war’. This re-inserted just-war considerations into the definition 
of the legality of warfare. This move, according to Schmitt, castrated 
the essence of the political—the sovereign decision to go to war against 
an enemy. Versailles thereby abrogated the cornerstone of the classical 
ius publicum, undermining war’s status as the autonomous, purest and 
highest form of inter-state relations; it transformed war into a policing 
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exercise, and thus re-domesticated it. Worse, the Wilsonian invocation 
of the concept of humanity reconnected post-Versailles conceptions of 
international law to mediaeval just-war doctrines, which contained a ten-
dency towards the total negation of the ‘just enemy’ and its degradation to 
an enemy of mankind—a non-human. Correlatively, it generated a new 
and distinct liberal way of war, more total in its aims than the bracketed 
and limited wars of pre-1914 Europe, since it aimed—next to the killing 
of non-humans—at the direct transformation of politics, society and sub-
jectivities: the making of liberal subjects.
Some followers of Schmitt detect in the hubris of post-Cold War us for-
eign policy—with its morally recharged discourse of good versus evil, 
humanity against terrorists, the impossibility of neutrality—a replay, if 
in intensified form, of the spectre of Versailles. This is embedded in a 
much broader and essentially continuous proclivity in us foreign policy 
since World War One and its redefinition of international law. In this, 
the invocation of humanity leads, paradoxically but logically, to the de-
politicization of former ‘just enemies’, their criminalization as outlaws, 
even their de-humanization as foes, and the radicalization and bestializa-
tion of warfare through its transformation into an annihilatory exercise 
of unqualified killing; the return of torture as a legitimate means against 
what are, by definition, non-combatants; and the structural impossibility 
of concluding peace in the absence of a legal enemy—a war without end, 
whose temporal ending is equivalent to either the murder of the last ter-
rorist, his incarceration without trial, or his re-creation as liberal subject. 
The ‘war on terror’ is also regarded as another incarnation of Wilson’s 
‘war to end all wars’, being paradoxically total in purpose and unending 
in space and time.
The totalizing character of the ‘liberal way of war’ invariably includes 
the liberal transformation of targeted states, societies and subjectivi-
ties; it is structurally incapable of leaving a defeated enemy state and its 
society intact, or of re-admitting it into the ‘international community’—
a historical practice ideal-typically exercised with post-Napoleonic 
France’s re-admission into the ‘Concert of Europe’, agreed at the Vienna 
Congress—without its constitutional and social alignment with liberal 
norms. Strictly speaking, the ‘liberal way of war’ deserves no longer 
the appellation ‘war’—hence the commotion around the term ‘war on 
terror’—but is transformed into a series of policing actions, including 
the bio-politicization of populations, otherwise known as humanitarian 
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intervention. Furthermore, the ‘war on terror’ after 9.11 does not 
constitute a departure from more law-based cosmopolitan forms of inter-
national politics, but represents an intensification of the logic of liberal 
world-ordering—the ‘neo-conservative turn’ in the us Administration 
notwithstanding. In the end, the argument is that the contemporary 
period presents a return to the civil wars of the pre-Westphalian period, 
even though American ‘world unity’ has immeasurably expanded the 
efficacy of universal law in a global age, defined as a ‘spaceless universal-
ism’ driven by the ideology of ‘pan-interventionism’.
These developments are inscribed in the long-term logic of the world-
historical departure from Schmitt’s golden age of limited inter-state wars, 
which then appears in retrospect as—and is accordingly elevated to the 
status of—the highest achievement of European civilization: the genius 
of European jurisprudence. Beyond this, some contemporary observers 
have re-mobilized, normatively, Schmitt’s idea of Großraum—a greater 
territorial space or a pan-region—as the elementary building block for 
an anti-cosmopolitan, anti-universal organization of the international 
order based on a plurality of co-existing Großräume, each one under 
the leadership of an imperial nation. Against the imminent threat of a 
‘spaceless universalism’, pan-regions are meant to provide guarantees 
against the homogenization of the world into a liberal flatland—essential 
for the maintenance of difference and pluralism; indeed, essential 
for the very possibility of the political, the friend–enemy distinction, 
encased in mutually exclusive regional blocs. Viewed synthetically, this 
account presents a powerful counter-narrative and conceptual appa-
ratus to the reigning discourse of liberal cosmopolitanism; it requires 
a careful re-examination.
2. an intellectual biography
In this highly charged context, Reinhard Mehring’s Carl Schmitt: Rise and 
Fall, billed by its publisher as the foundational biography on the subject, 
should come as a welcome clarification, illuminating the significance of 
an obscure yet scintillating thinker who has posthumously redrawn the 
conceptual coordinates of the debate on world power.7 Mehring is well 
7 Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt: Aufstieg und Fall, eine Biographie, München 2009, 
750 pp. 
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placed to perform this task. Currently professor of political theory at the 
Pädagogische Hochschule in Heidelberg, he is by background a politi-
cal theorist, holding a doctorate on Carl Schmitt from the University 
of Freiburg and a Habilitation on the political philosophy of Thomas 
Mann from Humboldt University in Berlin.8 An unceasing stream of 
publications on Schmittiana—from his 1989 dissertation, supervised by 
Wilhelm Hennis, via a 1992 introduction to Schmitt’s work and a 2003 
edited volume and commentary on Schmitt’s Concept of the Political, to 
his 2009 opus magnum under review—interspersed by numerous pub-
lications on modern German political philosophy (Weber, Heidegger, 
Mann, Nietzsche), has established Mehring as one of Germany’s most 
prolific Schmitt exegetes.9
How does Mehring conceive his task as a biographer? A biography on—
next to Heidegger—Germany’s most influential 20th-century thinker 
of the far right raises hopes for a careful explication of the principles 
of biography as a literary form. No such self-reflexivity is forthcoming. 
Instead, a few prefatory remarks sketch the premises of Mehring’s read-
ing: ‘This biography historicizes Schmitt’s life and work. It desists from 
delineating Schmitt’s position within the canon of the classics of politi-
cal thought or the history of public law and refrains from discussing 
his often warned-against actuality.’10 Such self-restrictions follow from 
a series of brusque and apodictic assertions. Schmitt’s direct influ-
ence, Mehring declares, is today past—a few but significant disciples 
who salvaged his work for a second liberal reception in the Federal 
Republic apart. His high systematic pretensions to thought are hardly 
recoverable and his political positions are today thoroughly discred-
ited. Furthermore, Weimar étatism, nationalism and anti-Semitism no 
longer exist. Although we experience today, according to Mehring, a 
new turn towards the Präventionsstaat and massive re-politicizations of 
law, Schmitt’s work has to be firmly re-situated in the interwar period 
and Germany’s catastrophic national history since 1914. Otherwise, 
misinterpretations beckon.
8 Mehring, Pathetisches Denken: Carl Schmitts Denkweg am Leitfaden Hegels. 
Katholische Grundstellung und Antimarxistische Hegelstrategie, Berlin 1989; and Das 
‘Problem der Humanität’: Thomas Manns Politische Philosophie, Paderborn 2003.
9 Mehring, Carl Schmitt zur Einführung, 3rd edition, Hamburg 2006; Mehring, 
ed., Carl Schmitt: Der Begriff des Politischen. Ein Kooperativer Kommentar, Berlin 
2003.
10 Mehring, Schmitt: Aufstieg und Fall, p. 14.
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Having cleared away in a coup de main the most controversial aspects of 
the current revival, Mehring suggests that Schmitt historicized his own 
intellectual production as a series of answers to specific challenges and 
situations. Consequently, his work resists reconstruction in terms of a 
systematic and over-arching theoretical architecture that would lend his 
intellectual trajectory coherence and continuity. It rather functions as a 
series of disjointed, time-bound and situative interventions into transient 
socio-political configurations, apparently without a unifying Leitmotiv; a 
polymorphology whose reconstruction is aggravated by Schmitt’s con-
stant re-phrasing, re-coding and recalibration of earlier works, driven 
by his desire to maintain control over a sprawling Gesamtwerk, whose 
polyvalences escape final judgement. No system is identifiable, no easy 
transposition of Schmittian categories to a re-configured present possi-
ble; this is the basis for Mehring’s attempt to insulate and quarantine the 
historical Schmitt against his contemporary resurgence and actuality—
admirers, falsifiers and detractors alike.
Thus conceived, Mehring provides a quasi-autobiographical, person-
alized and chronological reading, informed by the assumption that 
Schmitt’s intellectual production served as a self-reflexive attempt to 
seek normative orientation and self-stabilization in tumultuous times. 
Consequently, Mehring withdraws ad fontes into the archives, anchor-
ing his biography in the exploration of recently transcribed diaries of 
Schmitt’s Weimar period and correspondence from the voluminous 
Düsseldorfer Nachlass, supplemented by interviews with former disci-
ples, colleagues and friends, amply evidenced by 133 pages of endnotes. 
The overwhelmingly German apparatus of secondary literature remains 
largely unengaged, while the Preface notes in passing the effacement 
of some sources from Schmitt’s National Socialist period and the 
lack of access to his un-transcribed post-1933 notebooks and diaries. 
Ultimately, the biography is designed as an attempt to retrieve and 
reconstruct the key events and turning points—in the style of an histoire 
événementielle—that punctuated Schmitt’s life and work, in the register 
of a minuted chronicle that will result in ‘greater facticity’—a facticity 
apparently identical with that documented by Schmitt himself when 
taken à la lettre.
Unsurprisingly, Mehring readily concedes that ‘the biography seeks to 
avoid strong value-judgements and retro-validations, in an attempt to 
expose the open potentialities and contingencies of Schmitt’s life in slow 
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motion’.11 In fact, the organization and interpretation of Schmitt’s life 
and work revolves around his career trajectory, as the subtitle Rise and 
Fall indicates. For Schmitt’s fall is not tantamount to his entry into the 
nsdap on 1 May 1933, but ostensibly linked to his fall in the hierar-
chy of Nazi offices in late 1936. Apart from the chronicle structured by 
career progression, no particular angle is offered for the interpretation 
of Schmitt’s biography. ‘In the fullness of the material, the reader may 
sometimes miss a strong thesis’.12
Cursus vitae
With the remit of the work thus set—historicization, hermeneutic sub-
jectivism, value-neutrality, minuted chronicle, de-actualization—what is 
to be expected from Mehring’s Life? Can such authorial self-effacement 
and narrow biographical focus lead us beyond the privatissima of 
Schmitt’s inner world? What is the value-added of this massive undertak-
ing? Mehring offers the conventional story of the rise and fall of a social 
outsider from the Rhenish and Catholic provinces—academic and politi-
cal parvenu, victim of the lure of power, ostracized recluse—distributed 
across four main sections: rise in Wilhelmine Germany; beyond Weimar 
Bürgerlichkeit; in the stomach of the Nazi leviathan; slow retreat after 
1945. The formal stylistic principle of the biography consists in an alter-
nation between dense sketches, often in stenographic style, of Schmitt’s 
personal life-world—friends, colleagues and disciples; academic and 
political career; intellectual influences and academic vendettas; fam-
ily life including bigamy; sexual and alcoholic escapades; lecture tours 
and holidays—and short summaries of his writings, occasionally inter-
spersed by portraits of adversaries and mentors.
Throughout, Mehring situates Schmitt’s key works in relation to 
contemporary politics. The essential contours of Schmitt’s research 
programme are already identifiable in his writings during the late 
Kaiserreich. His 1910 Straßburg dissertation on Guilt and Types of Guilt 
established Schmitt’s anti-individualist reading of the state: the category 
of guilt is constructed through the positive legal norms of the legislature, 
bracketing the issue of extra-legal and moral guilt as a non-issue for the 
jurist. His 1912 monograph on Law and Judgement sketches Schmitt’s 
11 Mehring, Schmitt: Aufstieg und Fall, p. 14.
12 Mehring, Schmitt: Aufstieg und Fall, p. 14.
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decisionist disposition, already against Hans Kelsen’s legal positivism, 
as he defined law (Recht) as subject to the act of interpretation by the 
judicature, in the course of the application of law (Gesetz) to concrete 
cases; a praxeological move. The gap between the two is filled by an 
interpretative decision, law is subordinate to judgement. Schmitt’s 1914 
Habilitation, The Value of the State and the Significance of the Individual, 
pursues the idea of the construction of legal personality through the 
state, conceptualized as the mediating subject between law and power; 
the state’s legitimacy rests in its ability to codify and realize law as a state 
of law—assigning juridical subjectivity to the individual, in contrast to 
pre-state and ‘anthropocentric’ contractual and natural-law theories. The 
value of the state lies in its ability to create order. This move envisages 
legitimacy as immanent to the state itself, in its success or failure to 
carry out the rule of law, rather than in democratic or any other extra-
legal act of legitimation. The successful state of law institutionalizes for 
Schmitt a period of protection and order—a mediacy against the imme-
diacy of the relation between individual and state in times of crisis. Such 
a crisis of the state was precipitated by the declaration of war in 1914; it 
was averted by the declaration of martial law and an Enabling Act that 
authorized the state executive—the military command—to wield far-
reaching emergency powers, abrogating basic constitutional rights.
Schmitt was commissioned in 1915 to formulate a legal argument for 
the extension of extraordinary executive powers in the post-war period. 
The combination of the state of siege, civil war and socialist revolution 
in Bavaria prompted Schmitt to expand on the original task set, resulting 
in The Dictatorship (1921). It provides a history of constitutional law and 
the modern unitary state, largely discussed in relation to absolutist state 
theory—absolved from law—and introduces the distinction between 
commissarial, i.e. delegated and temporary, and sovereign dictatorship. 
It won Schmitt a position at the Munich University for Commerce and, 
subsequently, his first full professorial appointment at the University of 
Greifswald in Prussia at the age of thirty-three. Simultaneously, Political 
Romanticism (1919) settles accounts with the political passivity of a 
secularized, individualist and privatized social order whose historical 
bearer, the European bourgeoisie, failed to transcend the occasionalist 
ironism of an effeminate aesthetics and found itself defenceless against 
the spectre of socialist revolution and upheaval. The catastrophic end of 
the Kaiserreich—military defeat, dynastic abdication, Versailles Diktat, 
loss of Alsace-Lorraine, the creation of the Polish corridor, military 
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occupation of the Rhineland, reparations, loss of colonies, rump-army, 
republican constitution, war-guilt, Bavarian Soviet Republic, coups d’état, 
general strike—concentrated Schmitt’s thought around the question of 
constitutional and international law in relation to sovereignty. By the end 
of the Wilhelmine period, Schmitt had found his subject matter.
On the political
These early preoccupations are first systematized programmatically in 
his 1922 Political Theology, which reconceived the state of law and sover-
eignty from the angle of the exception: ‘Sovereign is he who decides 
on the emergency situation.’13 Not Weber’s classical definition of sover-
eignty as the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence, but the 
monopoly of the decision moves centre-stage. Schmitt develops this key 
thesis in his attempt to defend and strengthen Article 48 of the Weimar 
Constitution—executive government by emergency decrees—against 
legal positivism. This theme cuts across Schmitt’s major writings from 
his Weimar period: Roman Catholicism and Political Form (1923), The 
Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923), The Concept of the Political 
(1927), Constitutional Law (1928), The Guardian of the Constitution (1931) 
and Legality and Legitimacy (1932). Since legal norms could only function 
in normal situations, legal positivism was liable to a de-personalized, 
apolitical and ahistorical blindness. Sovereignty, according to Schmitt, 
is not invested in the state as an impersonal and objective legal subject, 
an aggregate of rules and statutes, but intermittently crystallizes if and 
when political crises and social disorder—liminal situations—escape 
constitutional norms. Such constitutional crises require an extra-legal 
and eminently political executive decision by a single authority for the 
re-assertion of order, grounded in the state’s right to self-preservation. 
Moments of indeterminacy and indecision in the objective legal order 
require rapid and firm, discretionary if not arbitrary, fact-setting acts of 
subjective decision. Autoritas, non veritas facit legem. Decisionism cap-
tures the idea that sovereignty resides ultimately in that power that can 
declare and enforce the state of exception, suspending the constitution in 
an emergency; its declaration cannot be derived from extant legal norms 
and standard procedures of decision-making. The sovereign decision is a 
self-referential and unmediated act of authority—singular, absolute and 
final. Jurisprudentially, it appears ex nihilo. This discretionary element 
13 Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, Chicago 
2005, p. 5.
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of ‘political surplus value’ re-established the primacy of politics over the 
rule of law. Legality does not exhaust legitimacy.
Decisionism was complemented by Schmitt’s concept of the political.14 It 
was formally defined in terms of an intensification of the friend–enemy 
distinction, which demands at some unspecifiable point a political 
decision on the identification of the internal and external enemy, in 
order to forge a decisive political unit and maintain existential collec-
tive autonomy. The decision activates the differentiation between inside 
and outside and, within the inside, that which must be externalized and 
excluded. This precipitated a redefinition of the meaning of democ-
racy. For Schmitt, ‘democracy requires therefore, first homogeneity and 
second—if the need arises—elimination or eradication of heterogene-
ity’, rather than the ‘perennial discussions’ of parliamentary democracy, 
grounded in liberal pluralism.15 This instantiated the consolidation of an 
otherwise intensely fragmented industrial and mass-democratic society 
into a socially homogeneous political community—and, ultimately, an 
ethnically defined (artgerecht) demos—through the joint first principles 
of autonomous executive sovereignty: external war and internal repres-
sion. The politics of the exception transmuted into the politics of fear 
as a socially integrative device. By appealing to the prima ratio of self-
preservation, the overriding threats to security and independence demote 
and flatten all domestic differences and generate the required unity and 
unanimity. Democracy, according to Schmitt, is thus re-defined in iden-
titarian terms as the direct representation of a unified people (Volk) by 
the political leadership; this may be mediated by irregular acts of sponta-
neous acclamation or plebiscitary elements, intermittently renewing the 
bond between leader and led—the national myth of direct democracy. 
Schmitt systematically deconstructs the bourgeois state of law in favour 
of the total state, in order to resolve the crisis of the Weimar Republic.
Schmitt advanced throughout the Weimar period in a series of swift 
career moves. He left Greifswald for the University of Bonn in 1922, 
breaking with—and being excommunicated by—the Roman Catholic 
Church over its refusal to annul his first marriage; then on to the 
University of Commerce in Berlin in 1928, where he excelled as a fre-
quent visitor of the Tiergarten milieu—laconically referred to by Mehring 
as an erotic state of exception—and finally to the University of Cologne 
14 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, Chicago 1996.
15 Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Cambridge, ma 1985, p. 9.
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in 1932, joining Hans Kelsen in the faculty of law. The early 1930s saw an 
increasing politicization of Schmitt’s extra-academic activities as a legal 
advisor, culminating in his appointment as the leading defence coun-
sel in the trial on the Preußenschlag—the abolition of the spd-governed 
Prussia as a state within the federal Weimar Republic—by Reichspräsident 
Hindenburg. Schmitt defended the primacy of the national state over 
its federal components. Although moving increasingly in national-
conservative circles, Schmitt only opted publicly for Hitler after the 
Enabling Laws of 24 March 1933. He joined the nsdap on 1 May 1933 and 
was appointed state councillor in Göring’s Prussian State Council and 
professor of public law at the prestigious Humboldt University in Berlin. 
This was followed by a period of enthusiastic engagement with National 
Socialism, rabid anti-Semitism and ex post juridical justifications for the 
Enabling Laws and assassinations of the sa elite in 1934.
Concrete-order thought
Schmitt’s writings during 1933–36, with the notable exception of the 
Three Types of Juristic Thought, are mainly short tracts and poisoned 
diatribes; they form the moral and scientific nadir of his career. After 
his ousting from power—Schmitt, Mehring clarifies, did not dissociate 
himself from the Nazis in 1936, but the Nazis dissociated themselves 
from him—he resumed his academic work and produced three major 
texts: The Order of Greater Spaces in International Law; Land and Sea; and 
The Nomos of the Earth, written 1943–45 but published in 1950; as well 
as the edited 1940 volume, Positions and Concepts, collecting the essays 
written in his struggle against Weimar, Geneva and Versailles. This 
turn towards international law and international history—insufficiently 
addressed by Mehring—was premised on a paradigmatic move away 
from political decisionism, which criticized legal normativism ‘from 
above’, to concrete-order-thinking, which attacked legal normativism and 
decisionism ‘from below’.16 This approach revealed another weakness 
in normativism, for which the original formation of statehood—indeed, 
the very presence of socio-political normalcy—is an extra-legal and non-
jurisprudential problem. Neither normativism nor decisionism had 
an answer to the question: what foundational ur-act of legitimacy pre-
cedes acts of legality? What constitutes territorial order? Any answer 
had to revise constitutional law in the direction of a sociologically and 
politically expanded notion of jurisprudence as a new type of juristic 
16 Schmitt, On the Three Types of Juristic Thought, Westport, ct 2004.
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thought, which Schmitt referred to as concrete-order-thinking. Here, 
the term nomos, in contradistinction to an undifferentiated universal 
cosmos, was designed to fill this deficiency in conventional jurispru-
dence. For ‘nomos is precisely the full immediacy of a legal power not 
mediated by laws; it is a constitutive historical event—an act of legiti-
macy, whereby the legality of a mere law is first made meaningful.’17 
This conception of a law-antecedent act of legitimacy came to inform 
Schmitt’s interpretation of the history of international law—from the 
Discoveries to the Großraum—for it put the question of the origins of 
spatial and legal order centre-stage.
What is concrete-order-thinking, as a sociologically enhanced jurispru-
dence in international law? Schmitt exemplified his paradigmatic turn 
most clearly in The Nomos. It is premised on a single over-arching thesis, 
stating that all legal orders are concrete, territorial orders, founded by an 
original, constitutive act of land-capture. This establishes a primary and 
radical title to land. Acts of land appropriation and distribution, their 
partition and classification, form the material matrix that constitutes a 
nomos. Schmitt derives the term nomos—in contradistinction to law as 
statute (Gesetz)—from the Greek verb nemein, meaning the tripartite 
act of appropriating, dividing and pasturing. ‘Nomos is the immediate 
form in which the political and social order of a people becomes spatially 
visible—the initial measure and division of pasture-land, i.e. the land 
appropriation as well as the concrete order contained in it and following 
from it.’18 Nomos connotes the situative unity of a spatial order (Ordnung), 
and the position or orientation (Ortung) of any community, creating a 
unity of space and law. Against the prevailing a-spatial, ahistorical and 
de-politicized legal positivism—which conceived of law, domestic and 
international, as an abstract web of norms, tied together in a seamless 
hierarchy, ultimately derived from the Grundnorm of the constitution to 
which even the state is subjected—Schmitt explicitly opts for this brute 
act of seizure and occupation to argue for the meta-legal origins of any 
international order which grounds its law in a material-terrestrial reality. 
Legal concepts have spatial origins. Might generates right.
Greater regions
Schmitt conjoined concrete-order-thinking to his critique of the post-
Versailles order and the Monroe Doctrine, in setting out the intellectual 
17 Schmitt, Nomos, p. 73. 18 Schmitt, Nomos, p. 70.
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terrain for his geopolitical vision of a new greater territorial order. This 
was encapsulated in his notion of Großraum, which argued for the co-
existence of several pan-regions, one of which included Central and 
Eastern Europe, under Germany’s imperial hegemony. The turn to the 
category of the nomos had a dual function. Firstly it offered a revisionist 
history of international law and order, as revolving around a series of 
land-grabs and ‘spatial revolutions’, which also served to heap up intel-
lectual resources and arguments to legitimize Hitler’s Raumrevolution 
and Großraumpolitik. Secondly, it detonated all the pieties of the League 
of Nations, as Nazi-German expansion was now inscribed within the 
trans-historical recurrence of primeval nomos-constituting acts of con-
quest and land appropriations. History is re-written in the light of 
Schmitt’s (geo)politics and this historical revisionism justifies German 
imperialism—a perfect circularity.
The anti-universalist category of the Großraum came to form the ful-
crum of the theoretical structure of Nazi international law, designed to 
revolutionize the international system. Schmitt was prescient enough 
and faithful to his own radical historicism not to harbour any nostalgic 
notions of a return to the classical inter-state civilization, as he saw it. The 
age of (nation-)states and the post-Versailles Kleinstaaterei (mini-state 
proliferation) was irretrievably over. The future, he argued, belonged to 
a different type of political unit, for which the Monroe Doctrine pro-
vided the historical and legal precedent. Schmitt’s normative agenda for 
a pluriverse of pan-regions was most clearly set out in his 1939 Order 
of Greater Spaces in International Law, published before the signing of 
the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (August 1939).19 Schmitt was scathing 
about the legal double-standards entertained by the us at Versailles: 
simultaneously advocating the notion of ‘national self-determination’ 
and ‘non-intervention’, conditional upon the acceptance of democracy 
and capitalism, while declaring the Western Hemisphere—South and 
Central America and the Pacific—an exclusive American zone. The 
American hemisphere was hors de la loi, i.e. outside the League frame-
work and outside any intervention by European powers.
Inversely, this American greater space would serve as the foil for 
Schmitt’s notion of a German Großraum—a self-contained and autarchic 
19 Carl Schmitt, ‘Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung’, in Schmitt, Staat, Großraum, 
Nomos: Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916–1969, Günter Maschke, ed., Berlin 1995, pp. 
269–371.
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German security zone, immune and off-limits to any intervention by 
raumfremde, i.e. alien, powers. For the Monroe Doctrine had not only 
prohibited interference by European powers in American affairs, it had 
also articulated a legal concept of American intervention and limited 
sovereignty for other states within the Western hemisphere. Hitler cited 
the ‘German Monroe Doctrine’ approvingly.20
Falling for Hitler
But what emerges, contrary to Mehring’s opening statement on the 
absence of a unifying centre in Schmitt’s work, is not a series of dis-
sonant and incompatible themes and theorems, but a concordant and 
consistent set of concepts and positions, consecutively and cumulatively 
developed well before Schmitt embraced the Führerstaat. This has direct 
implications for answering the central question of the biography: why did 
Schmitt opt in April 1933—after the Enabling Laws—for Hitler? For the 
conceptual failure in writing biography as a just-so narrative culminates 
in Mehring’s non-answer to this pivotal moment in Schmitt’s life. Rather 
than offering a reasoned explanation for Schmitt’s decision, Mehring opts 
for an exhaustive Topik of possible arguments and manages to compile 
an inconclusive shopping list of no less than forty-three motives—from 
personal resentment via opportunism to eschatology—which may or 
may not have played a role in his conversion. Ultimately, Mehring con-
cludes that Schmitt’s defence of the Weimar Präsidialsystem—executive 
government by decree—until late in 1932 renders his defection to 
National Socialism a clear ‘break’ in his politico-theoretical trajectory, 
apparently verified by Schmitt’s conceptualization of the Nazi seizure of 
power as a ‘legal revolution’. Mehring notes that Schmitt felt depressed 
in January 1933. ‘The fight against Hitler has failed.’21 This thesis reit-
erates the official reading in the Schmitt community.22 But neither 
Mehring’s indecision over Schmitt’s motives nor his discontinuity-thesis 
entirely convince, for the character-profile and political-intellectual posi-
tions that the biography has built up for the pre-1933 Schmitt provide 
stronger evidence for seeing it not as a discontinuity with the arch-
authoritarian positions formulated during his struggle with the Weimar 
20 Schmitt, ‘Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung’, p. 348.
21 Mehring, Schmitt: Aufstieg und Fall, p. 304.
22 This story is differently recounted in Bernd Rüthers, Carl Schmitt im Dritten 
Reich: Wissenschaft als Zeitgeist-Verstärkung?, 2nd ed., Munich 1990; and Rüthers, 
Entartetes Recht: Rechtslehren und Kronjuristen im Dritten Reich, Munich 1988.
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Constitution, but rather as their logical culmination and conclusion. 
For Schmitt’s increasingly radicalized world-view was deeply rooted in 
the organic continuity of his personal predisposition and political pro-
gramme. This created a maximum degree of compatibility between the 
ideology and praxis of National Socialism and Schmitt’s temperament 
and convictions.
For according to Mehring, Schmitt was not only a super-ambitious 
careerist, disloyal colleague and sexual hazarder, but a life-long critic of 
political liberalism, parliamentarianism, constitutional legal positivism 
and the multi-party state, predicated on a deep-seated anthropological 
pessimism; a disposition that translated into a coherent ideological pro-
ject which included political decisionism, the primacy of legitimacy over 
legality and the total state, governing against a heterogeneous society. 
Additionally, Schmitt valorized national myths as political instruments 
of mass mobilization and social integration, a lesson learned from 
Mussolini whom he visited and admired. He was a key protagonist of 
an anti-federal, unitary Reich. In international politics, Mehring reiter-
ates Schmitt’s role as an eminent opponent of the League of Nations, 
Anglo-American international law and the turn towards a discriminatory 
notion of war; this established him as one of Germany’s leading critics of 
the interwar order. His notion of the political, grounded in political exis-
tentialism, conceptualized the friend–enemy declaration for purposes of 
national unity, while his anti-Semitism and demands for racial homo-
geneity chimed with his notion of identitarian democracy. Schmitt’s 
anti-anarchist, anti-Marxist and anti-Bolshevik credentials need no elab-
oration. His anti-bourgeois resentments against the apolitical security 
of a life-form guaranteed by the sedated combination of private prop-
erty and legal guarantees are on record. All of this was informed by a 
metaphysical disenchantment, whose flip-side was a negative eschatol-
ogy and a theological philosophy of history, which tried to revalidate an 
absolute conception of the state as a restrainer against a thoroughly sec-
ularized field of social forces, most notably socialism—the anti-Christ.
Even if these building-blocks do not form a ‘system’ and do not eo ipso 
render a transition to the Führerstaat automatic, they supply a rich reper-
tory of ‘positions and concepts’—a theoretical edifice—whose structural 
affinity with the ideology and praxis of National Socialism Mehring 
himself makes blindingly clear. In fact, they predestined Schmitt like 
few others in the German far-right intelligentsia to opt for Hitler. While 
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these ideological compatibilities support the continuity thesis, the dis-
continuity thesis appears as a simple case of political opportunism—the 
switching of political horses at the last minute—earning him the sar-
castic epithet Märzgefallener (someone who ‘fell’ for Hitler in March) by 
the older party members within the nsdap establishment. For them, 
Schmitt was an unreliable turn-coat, who had jumped on the band-
wagon too late.
Mehring’s opening statement notes that Schmitt’s complex personality 
can hardly be unlocked with a master key. Yet the biography is meant 
to provide more than a personal psychogram of a stricken and talented 
thinker in an age of extremes; it aspires to be an intellectual biography 
of a modern classic of political thought. But if so, then Mehring dem-
onstrates in abundance that Schmitt’s long life revolved around one 
recognizable intellectual centre of gravity: how to reconceive the rela-
tion between constitutional and international law, the state and order, 
in a secularized age of mass democracy and war, through regrounding 
legitimate authority in a political theology of decisionism—in order to 
devise a politico-scientific programme of counter-revolutionary execu-
tive ultra-authoritarianism, which revalidates sovereignty as the purely 
political, beyond the state of law, while drawing sustenance from enemy-
declarations to secure existential and collective political unity? This deep 
and underlying problematic forms the basso continuo of Schmitt’s entire 
opus, from his early writings in the Wilhelmine period to the Political 
Theology ii of the Federal Republic.23
3. a salvage operation?
But can we extricate—beyond either demonization or apologia—
Schmittian insights from the odium of their association with Nazism? 
Is it possible to salvage Schmitt’s theoretical premises—decisionism, 
concept of the political, concrete-order-thinking—and his key concepts—
sovereignty-as-exception, friend and foe, nomos and pan-region—as 
generic analytics, which can rewrite the history of international law and 
capture elements of the current geopolitical re-ordering? Clearly, the 
central axis of Schmitt’s intellectual project revolves around the insuf-
ficiencies of legal positivism in answering the question of the state, in 
23 Schmitt, Politische Theologie ii: Die Legende von der Erledigung jeder Politischen 
Theologie, Berlin 1970.
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historical perspective. He formulated this critique, prior to 1934, from 
the vantage-point of political decisionism; and thereafter, from the angle 
of concrete-order-thinking, as a new type of juristic thought—the two 
methods that frame the categories above.
Analytically, Schmitt’s notion of the extra-legal decision which instanti-
ates the politics of the exception—while jurisprudentially an important 
corrective to the de-politicized world of legal positivism—is little more 
than a passe-partout that can be ‘applied’ to an indiscriminate range of 
polities which, under duress, turn to emergency powers. The application 
of Schmittian concepts to the exception can only descriptively confirm, 
a posteriori, an already instituted state of affairs as a fait accompli. The 
explanation of the emergency is outside their remit; its critique cannot 
be formulated from within the Schmittian vocabulary. Why is that the 
case? Since Schmitt’s method—be it decisionism, the friend–foe dis-
tinction, or concrete-order-thinking—is bereft of any sociology of power, 
decisionism lacks the analytics to identify what constellation or balance of 
socio-political forces can activate, in what kind of situation, the politics of 
the exception and fear. For the state of exception is never a non-relational 
creation ex nihilo—a unique and self-referential event, equivalent to the 
miracle in theology. It remains bound to the social by an indispensable act 
of calculation, preceding its declaration, as to its chances of implementa-
tion and daily public compliance or resistance by those upon whom it 
bears: the social relations of sovereignty. The exception remains quintes-
sentially inserted in a relation of power whose reference point remains 
the social. The decision alone is never decisive. Of the two sides of the 
exception—the power that invokes it and the power that is being excepted 
from the normal rule of law—Schmitt only theorizes the first.
Desocialized, Schmitt’s conception of sovereignty also remains curi-
ously de-politicized: he seeks to identify an Archimedean point not 
only outside society, but equally outside politics—super-insulated from 
any socio-political contestation—in order to neuter domestic politics 
altogether: ultra-sovereignty. This extra-political vantage point is delib-
erately chosen—and here political theology and hyper-authoritarianism 
converge—to pinpoint that chimerical location which re-stabilizes social 
processes from nowhere, ex nihilo, yet with overwhelming force: the 
apotheosis of the state. But this ‘place beyond’ really belongs to the 
sphere of theology proper. Here, at the latest, political theology—the con-
ception of sovereignty modelled on absolutism and the papal plenitudo 
teschke: Schmitt 81
potestatis—collapses into arbitrary state terror. Schmitt’s restrainer, 
conceptualized as the force that ‘holds back’, transmogrifies into the 
anti-Christ itself. Schmitt’s conception of sovereignty constitutes a 
normative prescription, designed specifically for a hyper-authoritarian 
solution to the intractable crisis of the Weimar state, and cannot function 
as a generic analytic for ubiquitous invocations of emergency powers. It 
is singularly unable to gauge the different constellations and transfor-
mations between political authority and social relations, geopolitics and 
international law; ultimately, spatial world-ordering.
Capture of the earth
But this was the task set by The Nomos of the Earth and the turn towards 
concrete-order-thinking in the mid-30s, generating a re-interpretation 
of history as a succession of spatial-legal nomoi which tied Schmitt’s 
present to a seemingly remote and recondite past. Schmitt’s glorifica-
tion of the classical age of the European inter-state civilization—the 
ius publicum europaeum—served the purpose of depicting the Anglo-
American conception of international law as degenerate and total, with 
Nazi Germany and Großraumpolitik as their rightful historical nemesis; 
in fact, the torch-bearer of geopolitical pluralism. Between the two cen-
tral axes that sustain Schmitt’s ideas of sovereignty—the brute act of 
land appropriation and the extra-political state of exception—his invoca-
tion of the ius publicum finds no systematic position; his approach to 
constitutional and international law receives its illumination from these 
two vantage points—above and below—but not from positivistic law 
itself. From his discussion of the discoveries of the New World through 
to the Großraum regional blocs, Schmitt’s reinterpretation oscillates 
permanently between two mega-abstractions: the literal acceptance of 
the ius publicum, endorsing a legal positivism and formalism that he 
otherwise violently contested; and the abstraction of spatial concre-
tion, which was originally meant to provide an antidote to the former. 
Between these two reifications, any determinate social content and pro-
cess disappears from view.
For concrete-order-thinking fails to provide guidance on what processes 
drive the politics of land appropriation and world-ordering. This leads to an 
a-sociological and curiously non-geopolitical—in the sense of geopolitics 
as an inter-subjective conflict—stance: the nature of 16th-century Spanish 
absolutism, the relations between the conquistadores and the Spanish 
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Crown, the inter-imperial relations between the expanding European 
overseas empires remain unexamined. The concrete processes of land 
appropriation, distribution and property relations in the Americas—the 
geopolitical clash with the natives as historical subjects—remain not only 
off-screen, but by definition outside any purely political or geopolitical 
notion of conquest-as-concretion. In this sense, concrete-order-thinking 
remains blunt, since the concepts for specifying the dynamics of the 
social property and authority relations that drive overseas expansion are 
nowhere developed or deployed. Schmitt’s non-sociological account of 
the New World discoveries is compounded by the absence of an inquiry 
into the inter-political nature of the encounter. The native Amerindians 
remain missing from his account of the regionally differentiated resolu-
tions of land and property conflicts. They are not even acknowledged as 
passive bearers and victims of the incoming Spaniards and Portuguese, 
but nullified and written out of history. Schmitt conceives of the Americas 
as a de-subjectified vacuum; the historical analogy between the Atlantic 
‘spatial revolution’ and genocide of the Amerindians, and Hitler’s ‘spatial 
revolution’ and Judeocide, comes into view.24
Schmitt’s interpretation of the classical period of European inter-state 
civilization, abstracted from the clashing value-claims and competing 
interests of ‘civil society’, is a historical fiction. The absolutist states—
Schmitt’s historical model for his redefinition of sovereignty—rather 
than institutionalizing a secularized notion of de-personalized sover-
eignty that neutralized domestic politics and rationalized inter-state 
relations, remained personalized, socio-politically highly contested, 
legitimized by divine authority, and embodied in the persons of their 
respective princes. Their inter-dynastic relations structured the intense 
geopolitical conflicts over ‘land and people’ across the period of the ius 
publicum: geopolitical accumulation.
Modes of war
Correlatively, the praxis of ancien régime warfare contrasts with Schmitt’s 
non-discriminatory concept of war as bracketed: civilized, rationalized, 
24 Mehring notes that Schmitt ‘regarded genocide and the Holocaust doubtlessly as 
crimes’, without providing references. ‘What did he know and what did he divine’ 
about the Holocaust? ‘On this, we can only speculate before the transcription of 
his war diaries.’ Mehring, Schmitt: Aufstieg und Fall, pp. 428–9. Schmitt remained 
silent on the subject for the rest of his life.
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limited and humanized. Early modern intra-European wars were not occa-
sional rule-governed contests—prettified by Schmitt as ‘duels’—narrowly 
circumscribing the external relations of states within an essentially stable 
inter-state order, but a continuous, structural presence that reached into 
and transformed their very sociological cores—permanent war-states. 
Ancien régime polities were not only sociologically transformed under 
the pressure of military rivalries, but eventually exhausted and destroyed 
by the combination of spiralling war expenditures, mounting public 
debts, repressive rates of taxation and social discontent. Wars eventually 
devoured their own masters—dynastic Houses.
While there is some evidence to suggest that the notion of Kabinettskriege 
attempted to rationalize the conduct of battle, the pairing of ‘limited’ 
and ‘total’ war, which Schmitt adopted from Clausewitz, is too coarse 
to capture the nature of early modern warfare. Clearly, Napoleonic and 
post-Napoleonic warfare marks a qualitative shift in the nature of mili-
tary affairs, though this does not mean that pre-revolutionary warfare can 
be generically referred to as bracketed or limited in Schmitt’s sense. His 
idealization of ancien régime warfare is compromised by the frequency, 
magnitude, duration and intensity, as well as the costs and casualties, 
of early modern conflicts. For example, at the end of the Seven Years’ 
War, casualty figures in the Prussian Army stood at 180,000 soldiers, 
which was the equivalent of two-thirds of its total size, and one-ninth of 
the Prussian population. This was partly due to innovations in military 
technology, including the development of firearms, artillery and new 
techniques like infantry volley fire; and partly to the existential threat 
of territorial dismemberment and re-partition posed by defeat to dynas-
tic Houses. Equally, the conduct of war was not humanized in terms 
of a clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants (ius in 
bello). The effects of war on civilian populations were devastating. Since 
war-logistics were not properly developed and soldiers lacked permanent 
provisioning, early modern armies lived ‘off the land’, either from loot-
ing and pillaging on foreign soil, or by way of sequestration and ransom. 
Armies tended to ransack civilian areas in an effort to feed themselves, 
causing plunder, rape, famines and population displacement. Bellum se 
ipse alet, ‘war feeds off itself’, captures this predicament.
For while most of these ‘wars of succession’ and ‘trade wars’ were largely 
re-distributional, in terms of land and control of trade routes, and thus 
limited in their war-aims, they were simultaneously ‘total’ in so far as 
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whole regions and kingdoms vanished (Polish Partitions); characterized 
by an imperial, if not totalizing, drive towards the infinite accumulation 
of land and booty, as evidenced in their aggressive outward orientation—
colonialism. Most of these ‘wars of succession’, from the Wars of the 
Spanish and Austrian Succession to the Seven Years’ War, were multi-
lateral if not ‘world’ wars. This would also qualify Schmitt’s thesis that the 
assignment of the lands and seas ‘beyond the line’—the externalization 
of the international state of nature from Europe—caused the civilization 
of intra-European warfare, as codified in the droit public de l’Europe. And 
how could Schmitt’s insistence on absolutism, as the historical model for 
a decisionist polity that gave free rein to rulers in imposing domestic law 
and order, be squared with+ their purportedly law-abiding disposition in 
foreign affairs and the rationalization of military conduct, formalized in 
the ius publicum? This pretence to legality by the Great Powers is charac-
teristically un-Schmittian. Logically speaking, the legal groundlessness 
of the subjective decision should have operated in external relations as 
much as in internal affairs—a conclusion that Schmitt failed to draw, but 
which is much closer to the historical record.
Missing the social
Furthermore, Britain’s post-1713 balancing of the continental inter-state 
system—empirically noted by Schmitt, but theoretically reduced to the 
extra-sociological category of ‘maritime existence’—eclipses a social 
account of Britain’s transition from feudalism to capitalism and post-
1688 transformation from dynastic to constitutional-parliamentarian 
sovereignty, essential for understanding the timing and socio-political 
sources of British balancing in the 18th century. At crucial moments 
in this large-scale re-interpretation—1492, absolutist sovereignty, early 
modern warfare, British 17th-century sovereignty, the origins of World 
War One, Hitler’s spatial revolution—the method of concrete-order-
thinking disintegrates. It simply fails to reveal the social sources of land 
appropriations and spatial reconfigurations, transformations in the 
nature of authority and sovereignty relations, or developments in the 
historical genealogy of war and peace. Furthermore, world-historical 
events that upset Schmitt’s spatial-étatist perspective—the origins 
of capitalism and Industrial Revolution; the French Revolution and 
Napoleon; the late 19th-century New Imperialism and inter-imperial 
rivalry; the Bolshevik Revolution—are either expunged from his 
account, or receive short shrift.
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Wherever Schmitt attempts to penetrate the social, he either mobilizes 
a geo-mythological register—British maritime existence, land versus 
sea—or betrays his own method; this is exemplified by his turn to inter-
national political economy, in the form of the Monroe Doctrine and us 
imperialism, in order to conceptualize the space-cancelling tendencies 
of international, albeit transnational, capitalism.25 For the predominantly 
non-territorial nature of the us restructuration of the interwar European 
order provided a direct refutation of Schmitt’s axiomatic thesis of inter-
national orders based on land-grabs: Germany, though trimmed in size 
and regime-changed, like Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, 
was neither occupied nor annexed. Schmitt’s account of the dissolution 
of the ius publicum—suggesting a constitutive nexus between the space-
cancelling tendencies of transnational capital and the transition from 
the ius publicum to the age of international law—directly unhinges the 
premise of his concrete-order-thinking.
This abrupt turn towards international political economy constitutes a 
theoretically uncontrolled volte face, not licensed by his own method. 
This forces him to deploy a Hegelian-Marxist figure of thought: the 
separation between the political and the economic, with its interna-
tional analogue, the separation between a territorialized inter-state 
system and a private, transnational world-market.26 Simultaneously, this 
turn towards the ‘separation-argument’ cancels his central thesis that 
the ius publicum rested already on the differentiation between public 
statehood—with the institutionalization of the early modern inter-state 
system—and private ‘civil society’. Schmitt over-interprets the space- 
and geopolitics-dissolving impact of Anglo-American capitalism after 
Versailles, effectively embracing a transnational economism that out-
Marxed Marx. The combination of the League of Nations system and 
American grand strategy did not lead to an apolitical ‘spaceless univer-
salism’ during the interwar period.27 Rather, it only re-constituted and 
25 Schmitt, Land and Sea, Washington, dc 1997, and Schmitt, Nomos, pp. 235–7.
26 ‘In an 1842–43 work, the young Karl Marx began with Hegel’s diagnosis and went 
even further in an important observation about the United States. Marx said that, 
as in 19th-century monarchies, republics, too, had defined the constitution and the 
state in terms of bourgeois property. Owing to the separation of state and society, 
politics and economics, he said that the material content of the political state lay 
outside politics and the constitution.’ Schmitt, Nomos, pp. 293–4. Schmitt refers to 
Marx’s ‘Contribution to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’ (mecw, vol. 3, p. 31).
27 Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization, 
Berkeley 2004.
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aligned European political geography with American economic and 
security concerns, without erasing the inter-stateness of the Continent—
as German Großraumpolitik itself was to demonstrate.
A flawed construct
Concrete-order-thinking is singularly unable to provide the concepts, 
or the historical substance, for an international historical sociology of 
any human order. It follows that, if Schmitt’s international political 
thought and historical narrative are empirically untenable and theoreti-
cally flawed—replete with performative contradictions, subterranean 
reversals of theoretical positions, omissions and suppressions, mytholo-
gizations and flights into épreuves étymologiques—then the neo-Schmittian 
revival hangs suspended in mid-air. Schmitt’s concrete-order-thinking 
constitutes a rudimentary and failed attempt to develop a sociology of 
international law and geopolitics, which ultimately regresses into a 
Eurocentric historico-legal theory of geopolitical occupation tel quel.
In the end, Schmitt provides no answer to his own question: what pro-
cesses established the order of the ius publicum? The ‘concrete’ is largely 
the factual. The descending journey, from the concrete to its manifold 
inner determinations, and the ascending return journey to the concrete 
as a ‘concrete in thought’, captured in its rich inner determinations, is 
never undertaken.28 The concrete–facticity turns into an abstraction in 
Schmitt’s work. But this cannot really be surprising: concrete-order-
thinking remains, throughout Schmitt’s work, strictly extra-sociological; 
as the lateral dynamics of geopolitics and ‘land appropriations’ remain 
abstracted from, and non-articulated with, the vertical dynamics of 
social relations and surplus appropriation. In fact, it is self-consciously 
anti-sociological, in line with Schmitt’s generic Weltanschauung as a 
counter-revolutionary étatist thinker. This suppression and elimination 
28 The notion of the ‘concrete’—alongside ‘organic’, ‘soil-bound’ and ‘chthonic’—
enjoyed a steep career in Nazi ideology as part of a wider idiomatic promotion of 
the ‘ideas of 1914’ against the ‘ideas of 1789’. It was not so much a neo-Hegelian 
Wunderwaffe, but part of the fascist jargon whose explicit purpose was to counter 
the ‘abstract’, ‘rationalized’ and ‘uprooted’ nature of social relations inherent in 
the community-dissolving character of ‘Jewish’ capitalism. The concretely ordered 
Raum of German provenance had to be defended and restored against the geo-
metric notion of territory as an empty and abstract expanse due to capitalism’s 
de-territorializing tendency.
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of social relations was, of course, already prefigured in his concept of 
the political, which now informed his concept of the geopolitical. Both 
detach the political, or geopolitical, from the social—in fact, prioritize 
and valorize the political and geopolitical over and against the social. 
This renders both the jargon of the exception (the reformulated essence 
of sovereignty) and the jargon of the concrete (the reformulated essence 
of territorial orders) abstract, formalistic and explanatorily empty.
Schmitt’s reconstruction of international law and order, from Christopher 
Columbus to Hitler’s spatial revolution, receives its decisive illumination 
from his own concrete political-existential situation in the early 1940s. 
Less than propaganda or fabrication, but more than tendentiousness, it 
may be defined as ideology production: a determinate re-interpretation 
of the history of international law and order. This would be in line with 
Schmitt’s own conception of intellectual labour as an on-going combat 
that crafts and re-crafts concepts, here situated in a particularly intense 
and turbulent period that demanded an existential decision on the 
friend–enemy divide in Germany’s struggle for political survival. This 
moment of supreme political intensity coloured Schmitt’s vision of the 
field of history. Any re-mobilization of Schmittian categories for today’s 
geopolitics needs to be weighed and offset against the fact that Schmitt’s 
core methods—decisionism, concept of the political, concrete-order-
thinking—are unable to sustain sociologically the abstract politico-legal 
register through which he formulated his ultra-realist critique of inter-
war reordering and the wider history of international law and order; his 
political theory comes with a hefty authoritarian political baggage which 
needs to be addressed.
4. a multipolar world order?
For what was Schmitt’s prescription against American liberal imperial-
ism? Is there any traction in the notion of the Großraum as an antidote to 
a perceived space-cancelling capitalist universalism? Towards the end of 
his Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt offers three speculative scenarios on the 
future, post-World War Two international order. First, the overcoming 
of the existing antithesis between land and sea in favour of one victori-
ous power, establishing ultimate ‘world-unity’—a tragedy in Schmittian 
terms; second, the passing of the ‘off-shore balancer’ torch from the 
uk to the us in the Cold War context—a second-worst option; third, a 
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new balance among a multiplicity of new Großräume. This last scenario 
would be ‘rational, if the Großräume are differentiated meaningfully 
and are homogeneous internally.’29 Beyond this, Schmitt remains 
vague on the inner constitution of each pan-region and on the nature of 
inter-Großraum relations.30
All three conceptions raise different sets of questions, none of which are 
worked out in any detail. Still, the normative neo-Schmittian argument 
clearly favours the last scenario. But by any Schmittian reckoning, a re-
construction of his concept of the greater space within his wider theory 
would require us to distinguish the inner nature of a Großraum, its con-
stitution, from its foreign relations, or the structure of inter-Großraum 
relations. To recall: Schmitt’s critique of parliamentary democracy 
and legal positivism, fashioned against the background of the Weimar 
experience, had led him first towards the affirmation of decisionism 
and the emphasis on the state of emergency. Schmitt’s state could not 
mediate and arbitrate the tensions of civil society but needed to be insu-
lated from it: to govern against civil society, to provide order. This was 
grounded in the conviction that industrial society, class conflict and the 
spectre of a socialist revolution demanded a reformulated theory of the 
state—and, ultimately, dictatorship. In other words, Germany required 
a ‘restrainer’ state, strong enough to de-politicize and neutralize social 
conflict by decision. But since any spatially expanded pan-region was to 
be composed of a variety of ethnically heterogeneous groups, creating 
a power-gradient between the imperial core, the Reich, and its satel-
lites, this power had to be magnified. It also had to include the ability 
to decide on the ‘internal’ as well as the external public enemy: the nec-
essary antagonism of the state-constitutive enemy–friend distinction 
and the ultimate manifestation of sovereignty. Given these Schmittian 
prescriptions, a re-mobilized notion of Großraum cannot be dissociated 
from Schmitt’s theory of the state and racist-identitarian democracy. It 
would either have to endorse them or, by leaving this Schmittian bag-
gage behind, move the notion of Großraum decisively beyond Schmitt’s 
theory of the state and democracy.
29 Schmitt, Nomos, p. 355.
30 This vagueness reveals the tactical precautions that Schmitt had to heed under the 
watchful eyes of the ss, as his Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung went through four 
editions between spring 1939 and July 1941, forcing him to adjust his Großraum 
idea to the ever more spectacular German foreign-policy successes.
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Regional limits
Territorially, along the lines of the Monroe Doctrine’s conception of a 
Western hemisphere, any pan-region would comprise an imperial cen-
tre and a string of smaller, subservient states, whose sovereignty would 
be conditional upon their alignment with the imperial constitution—
otherwise ‘intervention’ would beckon. Still, Schmitt was never able to 
clarify the exact mode of integration of these smaller states into the new 
‘greater imperial order’—federal, imperial, vassalic. Equally, Schmitt did 
not pronounce on the criteria for the territorial extent of each greater 
space—völkisch, martial, constitutional, civilizational, ideological, reli-
gious? His required ‘homogeneity’, however, would, of necessity, entail 
processes of state-led assimilation and homogenization.
Similarly, Schmitt did not specify the structure of inter-Großraum 
relations. Would a new inter-Großraum law emerge, similar to the ius 
publicum europaeum? Unlikely, given the heterogeneous nature of the 
future pan-regions. Or were relations between these regional blocs 
to be subject to Schmitt’s axiomatic friend–foe distinction, creating a 
sphere of agonal struggles ‘beyond the line’, indispensable for main-
taining the internal coherence, identity and discipline of each greater 
space? This seems to be more in line with Schmittian categories, since 
a singular pan-regions-encompassing nomos is inherently a contradic-
tion in his terms, leaving the need for plural nomoi—all civilizationally 
heterogeneous and, in principle, at war with each other. Decisionist 
authoritarianism, intra-imperial hierarchy and inter-Großraum anar-
chy, modified by balancing, are the most likely elements of Schmitt’s 
future nomos of the earth. Any invocation of Schmitt’s future order of 
pan-regions as a model for a pluralist planetary regionalism will need to 
counter these prescriptions.
Schmitt’s refusal retrospectively to discuss his Großraum-thinking in 
relation to National Socialist foreign policy raises the final question 
of their theoretical compatibility with, and Schmitt’s complicity in, 
Hitler’s spatial revolution.31 In his answer to Robert Kempner, Deputy 
Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials, written during his post-war 
31 Schmitt, ‘Response to the Question: “To what extent did you provide the theoreti-
cal foundation for Hitler’s Großraum policy?”’ [1947], Telos 72, 1987, pp. 107–16.
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internment, Schmitt remained unapologetic, vehemently denying any 
intellectual affinity between his Großraum conception and National 
Socialist foreign policy. He equally denied any significant personal 
contacts with the ns elite after 1936, repeatedly setting out the strictly 
juridical and scholarly nature of his studies. In fact, he tried to turn the 
argument around. The political justice that Schmitt once denounced 
in relation to the Versailles Diktat, but emphatically reclaimed for the 
total Führerstaat—‘the Führer protects the law’—was now conveniently 
re-invoked to reject Allied policy at the Nuremberg Trials. Nullum cri-
men, nulla poena sine lege. Schmitt’s retroactive redefinition of Großraum 
to a narrow juridical category avoids a facile identification with either 
organic-biologistic Haushoferian or Hitlerian notions of a greater 
German Lebensraum. But this disingenuous tactical redefinition of 
his intellectual production—as bearing an objective, non-partisan and 
scientific character, distant from the pseudo-scientific advocacy of his 
erstwhile party rivals and nemeses, Reinhard Höhn and Werner Best—
appears now in stark contrast to earlier self-confident declarations about 
the nature of scholarship. ‘All political concepts, images and terms’, 
Schmitt contended, ‘have a polemical meaning. They are focused on a 
specific conflict and are bound to a concrete situation.’32 Political sci-
ence and jurisprudence are themselves subject to, and in the service 
of, the highest and most intense differentiation—the friend–enemy 
distinction—which demands an existential act of decision. And Schmitt 
had taken that decision politically, not juridically. In the end, he felt 
obliged to re-describe and self-align his intellectual praxis with what con-
stituted his lifelong antithesis—neutralizations and de-politicizations.
5. legacies
In the final section of the biography, Mehring recounts how Schmitt, 
released after a short period of internment and not charged by the War 
Crime Tribunals, quickly moved back into intellectual life as a Nestor 
of various disciplines—history, law, philosophy, political theory—even 
though the loss of his venia legendi denied him a re-appointment as 
a university professor. He was obliged to hold seminars privatissime 
in his old Plettenberg home, also attending privately convened semi-
nars at Ebrach during the 1950s and 1960s, which were referred to 
32 Schmitt, Concept of the Political, p. 30.
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as counter-universities by their co-organizer Ernst Forsthoff, a for-
mer nsdap member. He refreshed contacts with past colleagues and 
comrades, found fame and a second intellectual home in Franco’s 
Spain, mocked the tyranny of liberal-constitutional values in the newly 
founded Federal Republic and the self-attested de-Nazifications of 
former Nazi colleagues. He soon regained intellectual influence in 
Western Germany via second- and third-generation disciples, confi-
dantes and interlocutors. Among them were Forsthoff, President of 
the Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus from 1960–63; Ernst-
Wolfgang Böckenförde, later a judge on Germany’s Constitutional 
Court; Johannes Winckelmann, editor of Weber’s Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft; Reinhart Koselleck, Roman Schnur, George Schwab—who 
introduced Schmitt’s work to the Anglosphere—and Odo Marquardt, 
associated with the Ritter School in Münster.
These are, in many respects, quite dissimilar figures and Mehring clar-
ifies both the intellectual and political distances taken from Schmitt 
and Schmittian persuasions sustained and developed by key group 
members. Sufficient commonalities remained for some members of 
this inner circle to launch in 1961 the politics journal, Der Staat, which 
remains to this day one of Germany’s most influential conservative 
reviews of state and constitutional theory; and to organize and contrib-
ute to a series of Festschriften until Schmitt’s death in 1985, at the age of 
ninety-six. Koselleck’s Critique and Crisis and his highly influential multi-
volume Historische Grundbegriffe project, co-edited by Otto Brunner 
and Werner Conze—a historical lexicon on socio-political concepts in 
Germany, predicated on the method of conceptual history—both fol-
low key Schmittian figures of thought, notably in the entries on state 
of exception, war, peace, international law and state.33 Wilhelm Grewe, 
a Schmitt disciple from the first generation and an nsdap memeber, 
was later West German ambassador to Washington, Tokyo and nato. 
In 2000 his Epochs of International Law, which presents an updated ver-
sion of Schmitt’s Nomos, with the great powers as carriers of successive 
international-law projects, was translated into English.34 In 1955, Grewe 
had formulated the so-called Hallstein Doctrine, which declared that 
West Germany would not enter into or maintain diplomatic relations 
33 Reinhart Koselleck, Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of 
Modern Society, Oxford 1988.
34 Wilhelm Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, Berlin and New York 2000.
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with any state that recognized the German Democratic Republic. The 
Doctrine was eventually abandoned by Willy Brandt in the context of 
détente. The list can be extended.35
Mehring’s account of Schmitt’s formative influence on a wide range 
of disciplines and their leading exponents, on the legal and diplomatic 
professions, and on judges in West Germany’s Constitutional Court—a 
liberal reception, he re-assures us—hardly corroborates his opening 
statement that Schmitt’s direct influence is today passed. Indeed, if 
his academic presence and contemporaneity within Germany is now 
well established, Schmitt’s political renaissance has kept pace too. 
Otto Depenheuer’s 2007 Self-Preservation of the State of Law—a law 
professor at the University of Cologne, Depenheuer is Director of the 
Institute for State Philosophy and Legal Policy—does not disguise its 
neo-Schmittian credentials and has been approvingly recommended by 
Wolfgang Schäuble, then Germany’s Home Affairs and now its Finance 
Minister. Its thesis was promptly tested by the dispatch of Luftwaffe 
Tornados, flying low-level to terrorize protesters at the 2007 g8 Summit 
in Heiligendamm—a violation of the constitutional separation of the 
terms of engagement of Germany’s military and police.36
Restricted to the German scene, Mehring’s optic misses the wider pic-
ture. Schmitt spawned intellectual legacies and ‘hidden dialogues’ 
outside Germany. Via a range of German émigrés—most notably Hans 
Morgenthau and, to a lesser extent, Leo Strauss—his thought was instru-
mental in the bifurcation of post-war American international studies into 
international law, following a legalistic and positivist-formalistic perspec-
tive, and international relations, with a power-political orientation.37 But 
the scholarly legacy appears blameless by comparison to the invocation 
of the Schmittian friend–foe distinction—only topped by references to 
Strauss and Nietzsche—within American neo-conservatism. The basic 
35 Müller, A Dangerous Mind; Christian Joerges and N. Singh Ghaleigh, eds, Darker 
Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe 
and its Legal Traditions, Oxford 2003.
36 Otto Depenheuer, Selbstbehauptung des Rechtsstaates, Paderborn 2007.
37 Alfons Söllner, ‘German Conservatism in America: Morgenthau’s Political 
Realism’, Telos 72, 1987, pp. 161–72; Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of 
Nations, Cambridge 2001, pp. 413–509; William Scheuerman, ‘Carl Schmitt 
and Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond’, in Michael Williams, ed., Realism 
Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations, Oxford 
2008, pp. 62–91.
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concept of the political that Schmitt constructed to defend Germany 
against American imperialism is now mobilized by neo-conservatives 
to cultivate an existentialist ethics for a post-welfare, patriotic and heroic 
community of American values.38 Yet, neo-conservatism reaches beyond 
this static dualism by adding an ideologically super-charged discourse 
of democracy- and freedom-promotion, which transcends the mere 
articulation of geopolitical differences to formulate a dynamic theory of 
American imperialism: neither ‘world-government’ nor Großraum, but 
a flexible front of the ‘willing’ against the ‘unwilling’, which feeds on 
the idea of the theatrical management and permanent mobilization of 
the state of exception—a war without end. The Schmittian net result, 
sketched in the Bush Doctrine and executed in the global war against ter-
ror, includes, inter alia: the strengthening of executive prerogatives; the 
doctrine of pre-emptive war; the abrogation of basic civil liberties; secret 
renditions and indefinite detentions; the use of torture; war crimes and 
the refusal to apply the Geneva Convention to prisoners of war. But these 
intellectual lineages and political legacies—Schmitt’s actuality—do not 
enter Mehring’s reflections.
Neutralization?
The biography ends simply with its subject’s death and a Schmitt cita-
tion from Homer’s Odyssey, also referenced on his gravestone, which 
evokes the term nomos in a final verbal smoke-screen. No conclusion 
or postface attempts an overall appraisal of his life and work, or tries to 
draw the summa of the book. Mehring vanishes behind Schmitt, leav-
ing him the last word. But no biography merely replicates a life, even 
if—as here—exhaustively sourced from autobiographical documents. 
It remains an authorial construction, a literary bios. Even as Mehring 
desists from articulating value-judgements, the edentate message of 
this ‘book without a thesis’ can be gleaned from a series of empathetic 
moves: complex and enigmatic personality, contingencies and fateful 
encounters, entrapment and entanglement, dangers of the twilight zone 
between science and politics, polyvalences and polymorphology, fate and 
fortuna. Their effect is to dissolve Schmitt’s authorship and transform 
him sotto voce from active player into a passive victim of forces beyond 
his control—a life riding tragically on the waves of history. Schmitt’s 
38 Jean-François Drolet, ‘A Liberalism Betrayed? American Neo-Conservatism and 
the Theory of International Relations’, Journal of Political Ideologies, vol. 15, no. 2, 
2010, pp. 89–118.
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lifelong passion for the auto nomy of the decision turns into its opposite. 
‘I have not decided anything: Hitler has decided’.39 The play with para-
dox turns surreal.
Mehring’s adoption of a largely hermeneutic perspective—Schmitt’s 
Nazi period apart—effectuates a near-merger between the author and 
his subject matter. This rewriting of Schmitt’s biography as quasi-
autobiography threatens to silence Mehring’s voice altogether, while 
rendering Schmitt’s self-interpretations and self-stylizations affirmative. 
This authorial self-elimination prevents Mehring from distancing himself 
from Schmitt’s own ex posteriori rationalizations of his journey through 
a disastrous century: his self-description as a ‘white raven’, caught up 
and seduced by the res dura of power politics; his self-comparison to the 
tragic figure of Melville’s Benito Cereno, the captain taken hostage by 
his mutinous crew; or his likening of his post-war Plettenberg home to 
Machiavelli’s San Casciano, the externally imposed retreat from his vita 
activa in politics. For Mehring, Schmitt’s biography is characterized at 
bottom by a dual loss, embodied in the two military defeats of 1918 and 
1945, which coloured Schmitt’s life as a long history of disappointments, 
mirroring that of 20th-century Germany. Loss and gain, defeat and lib-
eration, agent and victim—none of these crucial differentiations can be 
made within a purportedly value-neutral encapsulation that remains 
within the Schmittian world. The work of interpretation dissolves into 
empathy: relato refero—I report what I was told.
In a central passage of his 1989 dissertation on Schmitt, a younger 
Mehring declares: 
Schmitt’s partisanship lends an exemplary significance to his work. Every 
fascination for the scholar has to confront its political consequences, if it 
does not want to remain naive. This is also true for the more recent attempts 
to rehabilitate Schmitt by means of his intellectual influence and position 
in the human and social sciences: all Schmitt research is political, since it 
remains captured by Schmitt’s partisanship as the focal point of his work.40
But the measure for confronting its political consequences is neither 
denial nor moralistic indignation and exasperation—carefully reserved 
by Mehring for Schmitt’s Nazi period, though bracketed for the rest of 
39 Mehring, Schmitt: Aufstieg und Fall, p. 35.
40 Mehring, Pathetisches Denken, p. 23.
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his life—but a detailed judgement on the limits of Schmitt’s intellectual 
edifice and on the politically acceptable, within the totality of his work; 
for his times and for ours. If Mehring has backtracked from these earlier 
admonitions, in an attempt to mainstream and de-politicize Schmitt for a 
larger audience and a conservative Zeitgeist, then this indicates not only a 
loss of political, normative and intellectual co-ordinates—a Standpunkt—
but also an unconscious assimilation to Schmitt’s long-term trend-line 
diagnostics of the 20th century as the age of ‘neutralizations and de-
politicizations’, whose plausibility and veracity Schmitt’s decisionism 
and parti pris for National Socialism was the first to undermine. The 
unrelenting trumpeting of the age of neutralizations, a de-ideologized 
end of history beyond left and right, by the powers that be was itself 
an ideological exercise of the highest political order—something that 
Schmitt was clear-eyed enough to recognize and criticize. This simple 
Schmittian dialectical manoeuvre seems to be lost on Mehring.
